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WITHHOLDING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
FROM PRIVATE PRISON GUARDS:
A COSTLY MISTAKE
I. INTRODUCTION
During the last fifteen years, private prison companies have
contracted with states to incarcerate their criminals.1 The growth of
the private prison industry has led the Supreme Court, lower federal
courts, and various commentators to debate whether qualified
immunity, which protects public prison officials, should extend to
private prison officials. Last summer, the Supreme Court resolved
this question concerning private prison guards in Richardson v.
McKnight.2 In Richardson, the Court elected to deny private prison
guards who are sued by inmates under the Civil Rights Act of 18713
1. Private prisons currently hold approximately 77,500 of the 1.8 million prisoners
incarcerated nationwide. "Over the next five years, analysts expect the private share of the
prison 'market' to more than double." Eric Bates, Corporate Prisons Turn Public Money into
Big Private Profits, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Mar. 1, 1998, at Fl. Corrections Corporation of
America (CCA) and Wackenhut Corrections Corporation (WCC) dominate the private prison
industry with CCA controlling over 50% and WCC about 30% of the prison market. See Stacey
Hartman, CCA Starts California Dreamin, THETENNESSEAN, Feb. 22, 1998, at El.
2. 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). The Civil Rights Act of 1871 provides that an individual
may bring suit against "every person who, under color of any statute... of any State...
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.. ." Id. Section 1983 attempts to "deter state
actors from using the badge of their authority to deprive individuals of their federally
guaranteed rights, and to provide relief to victims if such deterrence fails." Wyatt v. Cole, 504
US. 158, 161 (1992) (citation omitted). Courts must be careful when "devising limitations to
[this] remedial statute... which on its face does not provide for any immunities." Id. at 171
(Kennedy and Scalia, JJ., concurring) (citation omitted).
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the privilege of qualified immunity.4 This Recent Development
contends that Richardson was improperly decided and will likely
cause unfortunate, unnecessary consequences for states, courts, and
private prisons.
II. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS
Qualified immunity insulates a select group of public and private
actors from certain types of lawsuits brought under the Civil Rights
Act of 1871, or 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 5 The Court currently employs a
two-prong analysis to determine whether an officer sued under §
1983 is entitled to receive qualified immunity.6 Under the first prong,
the Court assesses the common law history of immunity and
determines whether the official would have received immunity at
common law prior to 187 1.7 The Court has sometimes broadened the
4. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2107-08.
5. Qualified immunity protects an official from personal liability so long as she does not
violate clearly established federal law. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 at 818 (1992)
(holding that qualified immunity protects "government officials performing discretionary
functions... from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known").
Only objectively reasonable actions of an official are protected by qualified immunity. See
Richardson v. McKnight, Oral Arguments, available in 1997 WL 136255, Mar. 19, 1997. The
qualified immunity standard was applied to the facts of Richardson at oral arguments by Justice
Ginsburg: "how would it not be clearly established that it's a violation to take someone who
was over 300 pounds and put them in these tight restraints that are bound to cause extreme
pain? We are talking about qualified immunity and would a reasonable officer understand from
the clearly established law that you don't do this. That is my problem with this case." Id. If
qualified immunity is successfully invoked, it entitles a defendant sued under section 1983 to
the dismissal of the plaintiff's case prior to discovery. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
817-18 (1982).
Certain government officials involved in executive and administrative discretionary
functions receive qualified immunity protection. These include FBI agents, see Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987)), federal cabinet members, see Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S.
563 (1978), state prison officials, see Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978), state
hospital administrators, see O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), school board
members, see Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975), and public police officials, see Pierson
v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
6. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2103-04 (citing Wyatte v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 167
(1992)).
7. See id.; Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 339.40 (1986) ("Our initial inquiry is whether
an official claiming immunity under § 1983 can point to a common-law counterpart to the
privilege he asserts.").
Section 1983 does not grant immunity to any official. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S.
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first prong to include an inquiry into whether the defendant performs
a function analogous to one that would have received immunity at
common law.8 The second prong employed by the Court consists of
an evaluation of the purposes that underlie official immunity and
whether these purposes support extending immunity to the
defendant. 9 The Supreme Court advocates two primary policy
considerations under this prong: (1) to promote effective performance
by officers who might otherwise be inhibited by the threat of law
suits;' O and (2) to prevent qualified candidates from being deterred
from public service by threats of liability.l"
Notably, the Court utilized a different two-prong analysis in
deciding Procunier v. Navarette,12 a case that extended qualified
immunity to public prison officials who are sued by inmates under
§ 1983.13 The Court's holding covered all levels of prison employees,
from wardens to guards, but provided little rationale.'
4
409,417(1976) (Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 "creates a species of tort liability
that on its face admits of no immunities").
8. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 812-13.
9. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2103; Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 164 ("Additionally,
irrespective of the common law support, we will not recognize an immunity available at
common law if § 1983's history or purpose counsel against applying it in § 1983 actions.");
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 259 (1981) ("because the 1871 Act was
designed to expose state and local officials to a new form of liability, it would defeat the
promise of the statute to recognize any pre-existing immunity without determining both the
policies that it serves and its compatibility with the purposes of§ 1983").
10. See Forrester, 484 U.S. at 223 ("the threat of liability can create perverse incentives
that operate to inhibit officials in the proper performance of their duties.... When officials are
threatened with personal liability for acts taken pursuant to their official duties, they may well
be induced to act with an excess of caution or otherwise to skew their decisions in ways that
result in less than full fidelity to the objective and independent criteria that ought to guide their
conduct.").
The Court has balanced the benefit of decisive action against the risk of violating inmates'
rights should officers perform irresponsibly. See Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. at 167 ("Qualified
Immunity strikes a balance between compensating those who have been injured by official
conduct and protecting government's ability to perform its traditional functions.").
11. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. at 814; Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. at 167.
12. 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
13. Seeid.
14. See id.
1998]
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III. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND PRIVATE PARTIES PURSUING
PRIVATE CONCERNS
The Supreme Court applies the same two-part test to private
parties that it applies to public parties."5 Under the first prong of the
test, private parties must show either that the common law extended
immunity to a private party performing their role or to their
functional equivalent.1 6 Under the second prong, a private party must
demonstrate that policy considerations of promoting unfettered public
service, attracting qualified candidates to such service, and
minimizing litigation are served by extending qualified immunity."
Private parties who are sued under § 1983 for conduct involved in
pursuing strictly private concerns are unlikely to be protected by
qualified immunity. The Supreme Court addressed such a situation in
Wyatt v. Cole.18 In Wyatt the Court held that a private party who
invokes a presumptively valid attachment, garnishment, or replevin
statute, which is later determined by the Court to be unconstitutional,
does not receive qualified immunity protection from a § 1983
lawsuit.19 The Court made this determination based on an analysis of
common law history and policy.20 It first searched the common law
for evidence of immunity for private parties involved in private
undertakings and found no basis for such immunity. 21 The Court then
found policy concerns favoring immunity unavailing.22 It did not,
however, explicitly exclude private parties from protection under all
15. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 1203; Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 167-69.
16. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2104; Wyatt, 504 U.S. at 168. Note, however, that the
functional equivalency test may no longer be applicable in this context. See Richardson, 117 S.
Ct at 2106.
17. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2105-08.
18. 504 U.S. 158 (1992).
19. See id. at 168-69. In Wyatt, A rancher brought a lawsuit under section 1983 against his
partner for invoking an unconstitutional Mississippi replevin statute. See id.
20. See id. at 161.
21. See id. at 165.
22. See id. at 167-69. The court reasoned that private citizens do not require the same
protection that public officials require because the public good is not affected by their actions in
the same way. See id. at 169. While public officials need to exercise discretion in their offices
in a forceful and decisive manner in the interest of the public, private parties do not. See id. In
addition, one of the key features of immunity, encouraging qualified individuals to run for
public positions, is moot with private parties. See id.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol54/iss1/16
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circumstances.
23
IV. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND PRIVATE CORRECTIONAL
INSTITUTIONS
A. Richardson v. McKnight
A different circumstance was presented in Richardson v.
McKnight,24  a case involving private parties pursuing public
concerns. The private party in Richardson was Corrections
Corporation of America (CCA), a privately owned prison corporation
that contracted with the state of Tennessee to pursue the public
concern of incarcerating criminals.25 In Richardson, Ronnie Lee
McKnight, an inmate at South Central Correctional Center in
Tennessee, sued two prison guards, Darryl Richardson and John
Walker, under § 1983 for violating his Eighth Amendment right to be
free from cruel and unusual punishment.26 The Supreme Court held
that private prison guards are not entitled to qualified immunity from
lawsuits brought by prisoners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.27
In reaching its decision in Richardson, the Court declared that
Wyatt, a case involving private actors pursuing private concerns, 8
established the standard for extending qualified immunity to private
parties.29 Accordingly, it applied the two-prong Wyatt analysis,
requiring that it (1) look to the common law history of government
employee immunity, and (2) look to the policy concerns that underlie
government employee immunity.30 The Court noted, however, that
23. See id. at 169. The Court left open "the possibility that private defendants faced with
§ 1983 liability ... could be entitled to an affirmative defense based on good faith and/or
probable cause or that section 1983 suits against private, rather than governmental, parties could
require plaintiffs to carry additional burdens." Id (citation omitted).
24. Richardson v. McKnight, 117 S. Ct. 2100 (1997).
25. See id. at 2102. CCA is the largest prison management firm in the United States and
houses over half of the nation's privately-held prisoners in its facilities. See Bates, supra note 1,
at Fl.
26. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2102. McKnight alleged that his rights were violated
when guards placed excessively tight physical restraints on his large ankles.
27. Seeid at2107-08.
28. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
29. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2103-04.
30. Seeid. at2103.
1998]
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the specific holding in Wyatt left unresolved the question of whether
to extend immunity to privately employed prison guards.3 1
The Court in Richardson concluded that neither common law
history nor the purposes of qualified immunity justified extending
such immunity to private prison guards.32 It reasoned that although
public prison guards benefited from immunity at common law,33
there was no history of immunity for private prison companies at
common law.34 In addition, the Court de-emphasized,35 and may have
dismissed entirely,36 the functional equivalency test as a means of
determining whether to grant a private party immunity.37
The Court acknowledged, however, that the second policy prong
required a more difficult analysis.38 It found that although decisive
action on the part of prison officers is an important policy to promote,
this concern is more relevant to the public sector than to the private
sector where a competitive market operates.39 If a private prison
guard fails to react in a principled and fearless manner, the prison
environment will deteriorate with violence.40 Such an event would
compel prison administrators to either employ guards who ensure
prison security or jeopardize their contract with the state.4' In
31. See id. at 2104 ("Wyatt, then, did not answer the legal question before us, whether
respondents-two employees of a private prison management firm-enjoy a qualified
immunity from suit under § 1983. It does tell us, however, to look both to history and to the
purposes that underlie government employee immunity in order to find the answer").
32. See id. at 2107-08 ("Our examination of history and purpose thus reveals nothing
special enough about the job or about its organizational structure that would warrant providing
these private prison guards with a governmental immunity.').
33. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. at 561-62.
34. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2105. Although history shows that even before the 19th
century, private contractors sometimes handled prison activities, there is no conclusive
historical evidence of an immunity for them. See id.
35. See id. ("The Court has sometimes applied a functional approach in immunity cases,
but only to decide which type of immunity-absolute or qualified-a public officer should
receive.").
36. See id. at 2106 ("The Court . . .never has held that mere performance of a
governmental function could make the difference between unlimited § 1983 liability and
qualified immunity, especially for a private person who performs a job without government
supervision or direction.').
37. See id.
38. See id. at 2105 ("Whether the immunity doctrine's purposes warrant immunity for
private prison guards presents a closer question.").
39. Seeid.at2106.
40. See id
41. See id.
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addition, the Court determined that a second policy goal of attracting
qualified employees by minimizing the risk of lawsuits was similarly
of more concern in the public sector than the private context where
private incentives and benefits are available for employees.42
B. Problems with the Richardson Decision
In order for the Court's decision to treat private prison guards
differently than public prison guards with regard to qualified
immunity to make legal sense, the two-prong test should yield a
different result in the private context than in the public context. If the
test results are the same in both contexts, there can be no justification
for providing qualified immunity in one but not the other. The
Court's determination that private guards do not meet the first prong
hinges on its unfortunate dilution of the functional equivalency test.43
Had the Court recognized functional equivalency, its holding with
regard to public guards in Procunier should have extended to private
guards in Richardson.44
Similarly, for the Court to reach different conclusions for private
and public guards under the second prong of the two-prong test, the
circumstances under which the guards work should be
distinguishable. Without a true distinction between public and private
prison work environments, the Court's policy balancing for public
prison guards in Procunier should also apply equally to private
guards.45
42. See id. at2107.
43. See supra note 8; see also Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2106, 2109 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting). In his dissenting opinion in Richardson, Justice Scalia took issue with the
majority's dismissal of the Court's "settled practice of determining § 1983 immunity on the
basis of the public function being performed." Id. at 2109.
Commentators have deemed the majority's decision to minimize the functional equivalency
test, in addition to disregarding precedent, illogical. See Charles W. Thomas, Resolving the
Problem of Qualified Immunity for Private Defendants in Section 1983 and Bivens Damage
Suits, 53 LA. L. REV. 449,487 (1992).
44. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2112 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
45. See id. Justice Scalia argues that the circumstances of private and public guards are
equivalent: "Today's decision says that two sets of prison guards who are indistinguishable in
the ultimate source of their authority over prisoners, indistinguishable in the powers they
possess over prisoners, and indistinguishable in the duties they owe towards prisoners, are to be
treated quite differently in the matter of their financial liability." Id.
19981
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1. Competitive Market Pressures
The Court in Richardson mistakenly relied on competitive market
pressures to distinguish the functioning of prison guards in the private
versus public prisons. The Court's reasoning contains several
problematic assumptions: (1) a state's supervision of private prisons
is adequate to ensure that private prison operators deliver the quality
of product for which a state bargained; (2) entry costs for the private
prison market in a state allow prison corporations to competitively
bid against a prison corporation that has an existing contract; and (3)
politics are uninvolved in the contract bidding process.46 These
assumptions fail in the private prison context and undermine the
Court's rationale in Richardson.
The first assumption fails because states are unlikely to monitor
private prisons sufficiently to ensure that prisons are safe and
effective and guards are not too timid.47 When a consumer (the state
and its citizens) is unable to determine the quantity and quality of a
delivered good (prison services), the seller (private prisons) may
provide fewer or inferior goods than were bargained for without the
consumer's knowledge. This type of market failure is likely to occur
in a private prison setting because the state's monitoring is
inadequate due to the difficulty of supervision 8  and other
impediments to monitoring.49
The second assumption fails because the Court failed to account
for the monopolistic features present in the prison industry. 0 After a
46. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2106-07.
47. See Richardson v. McKnight Oral Arguments, supra note 5, at 33-35. Tennessee's
monitoring of private prisons, which is limited to biennial supervision by certain committees of
the Tennessee legislature, is an illustration of inadequate state supervision. See id.
48. See Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 205 (1985) (discussing the general
inaccessibility to prisons for any type of public observation); see also James Theodore Gentry,
Note, The Panopticon Revisited: The Problem of Monitoring Private Prisons, 96 YALE L.J.
353,356-57 (1986).
49. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2111 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia noted that
effective state supervision is dependent on the political process: "The process can come to
resemble a market choice only to the extent that political actors will such resemblance-that is,
to the extent that political actors... are willing to pay attention to the issue of prison services,
among the many issues vying for their attention. Id.; see also Qualified Immunity-
Privatized Governmental Functions, 111 HARV. L. REV. 390,396 n.54.
50. See Gentry, supra note 48, at 357-58.
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private prison corporation survives the initial competitive bidding
process and secures a contract with a state, it is unlikely that other
prison corporations will be able to enter the prison market in the
future due to market entry costs. 51 Therefore, another corporation
which hopes to compete for a state's prison contract will be at a
major disadvantage in bidding for future contracts because it will
have to figure into its bid capital costs that the existing firm can
exclude.52 The "discount" offered by the existing firm is likely to
influence a state to renew its contract.
53
The third assumption fails because politics heavily influence state
decisions to award prison contracts.54 In Tennessee, the role of
politics in the prison industry is evidenced by the significant
monetary contributions made by CCA to state public officials. As a
result of market failure, monopolistic characteristics, and politics in
the private prison industry, if guards perform indecisively and
ineffectively it is unlikely that a state will detect their incompetence
and, even if it does, that it will effectively pressure the prison to
improve its performance.55
2. Profit Motive
Another possible distinction between public and private prison
environments that might justify withholding qualified immunity
protection from private prison guards is the impact of a profit motive
on the discretionary decisions of private prison management
officials. 6 A profit motive is likely to influence the decisions made in
private prisons by management officials who are responsive to
51. See id. This is primarily due to the existing prison firm's ownership of the only
available prison facilities and employment of available prison workers.
52. See id. at 358.
53. See id.
54. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2111 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
55. See id. at 2111 ("[S]hort of mismanagement so severe as to provoke a prison riot,
price (not discipline) will be the predominating factor in such a regime's selection of a
contractor.").
56. See McKnight v. Rees, 88 F.3d 417,424-25 (6th Cir. 1996). The Sixth Circuit's denial
of qualified immunity to prison guards rested at least in part on what it perceived to be the
tendency of a profit motive to encourage prison officials to violate the civil rights of prisoners.
See id
1998]
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shareholders of the prison corporation. Profits are likely to
influence prison management to act in two conflicting ways, both
aimed at lowering costs: first, managers and wardens may attempt to
minimize services, staffing and training of employees; second,
managers may try to minimize litigation costs and costly violent
outbreaks by prisoners. s These interests may conflict with each other
because reducing services, staffing, and guard training may trigger
violations of prisoners' civil rights or create an unsafe prison
environment. The resulting lawsuits or violence will raise costs and
cut into a prison firm's profits. Due to this prospect, managers may
provide adequate services, staffing, and training for guards in order to
decrease the risk of lawsuits and violence. These measures, however,
will raise costs and reduce profits. Due to a lack of empirical
evidence, it is unclear whether one of these two interests will
dominate the decisions of management.5 This uncertainty is
compounded by the existence of other cost-saving options available
to prison firms that do not jeopardize prisoners' civil rights.6" And,
57. Management officials seek to run a corporation as efficiently and cost-effectively as
possible in order to maximize profits.
58. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2111-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("A contractor's price
must depend upon its costs; lawsuits increase costs; and 'fearless' maintenance of discipline
increases lawsuits [.. .The more cautious the prison guards, the fewer the lawsuits, the higher
the profits."; see also Martin E. Gold, The Privatization of Prisons, 28 URB. LAW. 359, 380-81
(1996).
59. In addition to concern over litigation, private prison management firms may feel
compelled to maintain adequate services, staffing, and training because their contracts with
states specifically require certain standards of quality. See Matters Relating to the Federal
Bureau of Prisons: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the Committee on the Judiciary
House ofRepresentatives, 104th Cong. 100 (1995) [hereinafter Hearing] (Prepared statement of
Charles W. Thomas) ("[Sitatutory and/or contract requirements so routinely oblige private
firms to employ persons who meet or exceed all applicable experience, certification, and
training requirements their public sector counterparts must meet"); see also Robert B. Schaffer,
The Public Interest in Private Party Immunity: Extending Qualified Immunity From 42 U.S.C. §
1983 to Private Prisons, 45 DUKE L.1 1049, 1084 n.237 (citing state statutes in Florida, New
Mexico, Tennessee, and Texas that require strict standards for private prisons). Compliance
with such contract specifications, however, may be lax due to a state's limited supervision and
the monopolistic nature of the private prison industry.
60. Other cost-saving strategies by private firms may spare a reduction in services,
training, and staffing. For example, modem prisons built by private firms have cost saving
features that reduce the total staff needed without compromising the quality of service and
security. See Gold, supra note 59, at 382-83. (discussing the advantages that a private prison
can derive from design, construction, and operations).
Another cost-saving mechanism utilized by private firms is replacing public employee
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol54/iss1/16
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even if it could be shown that profit motives will lead prison
managers to cut services, training, and staffing, it is far from clear
that either profit motives or these decisions by management will
effect the discretionary decisions of prison guards-the subject of
Richardson-in a manner that jeopardizes the civil rights of
prisoners.
61
Furthermore, assuming that profit motives cause private prison
managers to compromise services, staffing, and training, there is
simply no basis for concluding that the quality of prison services,
training, and staffing in public prisons is superior to those in private
prisons.62 In fact, public prisons may be more likely than private
prisons to compromise services, training, and staffing because (1)
they are often politically unaccountable,63 (2) public spending to
pension plans with stock ownership plans. Stock ownership plans are cheaper for the employer,
although less reliable for employees than pension plans that are guaranteed. See id.
61. It is unlikely that prison guards are motivated by profits. See Citrano v. Allen
Correctional Center, 891 F. Supp. 312, 319 (W.D. La. 1995) (discussing the various motivation
of prison employees).
Although outside of the scope of Richardson, which dealt solely with qualified immunity
for prison guards, an argument could be made that management officials or wardens who
possess discretion over the provision of services should be denied qualified immunity in order
to counter their incentive to reduce services such as food and health care in order to cut costs.
Such an argument, however, presumes that an effective counter-balance is not already built into
the profit motive in the form of reducing litigation costs.
In addition, it has been argued that prison management's decisions to reduce staffing and
training have a direct bearing on prison guard conduct. See Qualified Immunity-Privatized
Governmental Functions, November, 111 HARV. L. REV. 390, 398 (1997) ("[A] particularly
formidable and distinctive pressure-the profit motive-arguably is able, when market forces
are absent, to operate on private prison providers to curtail timidity among their employees in a
way that renders qualified immunity unnecessary."). However, the conclusion that under-
staffed, under-trained guards act more aggressively than trained guards seems speculative. See
id. at 399.
62. See Citrano v. Allen Correctional Center, 891 F. Supp. at 319 ("Even if it is assumed
that expenses can be reduced by "skimping" on civil rights, government is no doubt also
motivated to cut costs .... There is no substantial basis to conclude that cost consciousness
would be more apt to result in the deprivation of prisoners' civil rights if a government
contractor was involved as opposed to government employees.").
63. See Gold, supra note 58, at 381. Gold notes that:
In comparing the accountability of publicly and privately operated facilities, it is often
assumed that the public sector as a whole is fully and continually accountable. In
reality, however, only elected officials are fully accountable. As we proceed down a
governmental hierarchy, deeper and deeper into the bureaucracies of appointed
officials and civil servants, accountability diminishes. Add to that the protection and
rigidity of civil service rules ....
1998]
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improve prison conditions is generally unpopular and must compete
for funds with other government services, and (3) prison resources
are strained by the national rise in the number of inmates.65 And
although there are reports of poor services, training, staffing, and
prisoner treatment in private prisons, there is similar evidence
available concerning public prisons.66 Furthermore, several studies
conclude that the overall quality of private 'prisons exceeds that of
public prisons.67
Id.
64. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct at 2111 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65. See Natalie Phillips, State Has Too Many Inmates, Too Few Beds, ANCHORAGE
DAILY NEWS, Mar. 1, 1998, at Al (discussing the overcrowding of prisons as a result of
President Clinton's "get tough on crime" agenda.).
66. See Editorial, Who Guards the Prison Guards? More Reforms are Needed in State
Operations, THE ORANGE COUNTY REGISTER, Mar. 1, 1998, at G2 (reporting that state prison
resources in California are overburdened due largely to the fact that the number of inmates has
tripled in the last twenty years). According to the Prison Law Office, a prison reform group, the
need for new officers leads to rapid advancement within the system. This results in less
experienced people being promoted to supervisory positions. State prison officers in California
receive only six weeks of training, compared to the six months required by municipal police
departments. The Register also reported that eight public prison officials-guards and
wardens-at the Corcoran state Prison in California received federal indictments for prisoner
civil rights violations, "including one who was shot to death moments after a guard said it was
about to be duck hunting season on an exercise yard." Id. Investigators for the Register
uncovered that twenty-seven unarmed inmates had been killed by guards in the five years prior
to October 1994. See id.; see also Natalie Phillips, State Has Too Many Inmates, Too Few Beds,
Anchorage Daily News, Mar. 1, 1998, at Al (discussing Alaska's overcrowding problems).
Any attempt to differentiate the quality of guards in public and private prisons is further
obscured by the fact that private prison firms hire many of their officials-both wardens and
guards---from public prisons. The poor conduct of some private guards is merely a continuation
of their conduct while serving as public employees: "The guards videotaped earlier this year
assaulting prisoners with stun guns at a C.C.A. competitor in Texas had been hired despite
records of similar abuse when they worked for the state." Id.
67. See Hearing, supra note 59, at 106; see also Charles H. Logan, Well Kept: Comparing
Quality of Confinement in Private and Public Prisons, 83 . CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 577,
601 (1992). Logan compared three prisons (one private, one state, and one federal) to assess
their "quality of confinement" according to security, safety, order, justice, care, conditions,
activity, and management. He used information from staff and inmate versions of the Prison
Social Climate Survey developed by the Bureau of Prisons as well as official data "coming
from such sources as grievance logs, significant incident and discipline logs, health clinic logs,
inmate work and education records and staff personnel records." Id. at 593. Based on this
information, he concluded that "[t]he private prison outperformed the state and federal prisons,
often by quite substantial margins, across nearly all dimensions" and maintained lower costs.
Id. at 601-02. Logan's report was identified by Thomas in his testimony before the
subcommittee on crime as "the most sophisticated report regarding the quality of private
prisons." See Hearing, supra note 59, at 106.
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3. Conclusion
Neither competitive market pressures nor a profit motive
differentiate the circumstances of private prison guards from their
public counterparts. Without a change in the factors that led the Court
to extend qualified immunity to public prison guards in Procunier,
the same privilege should apply equally to private prison guards.
68
Furthermore, the costly consequences to states, private prisons, and
courts of depriving guards of qualified immunity weighs heavily in
favor of granting immunity to private prison guards.
V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF WITHHOLDING QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
FROM PRIVATE PRISON GUARDS: RICHARDSON'S IMPACT
The Court's decision in Richardson to deny qualified immunity to
private prison guards will: (1) burden the courts with a massive
increase in frivolous prisoner lawsuits; (2) encourage "unwarranted
timidity" from private prison guards, thereby compromising their job
effectiveness and the security of prisons; and (3) artificially raise the
costs to states of contracting prison services out to private prison
management firms.
A massive increase in prisoner litigation will further burden courts
that are already inundated with prisoner lawsuits, many of which lack
merit.69 The Richardson decision's facilitation of prisoner litigation
contradicts the policy concerns enumerated in Wyatt and incorporated
into Richardson against litigation concerns.70 It also contradicts the
68. If the balancing in Procunier was mistaken in hindsight, then the Court should address
the problem at its root by withholding immunity from all prison guards, not just private guards,
as it did in Richardson.
69. See Raine v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 698, 702 (7th Cir. 1987) In Raine, Judge Posner wrote:
These courts are being flooded by prisoner litigation... Most of this litigation has very
little merit.... However, unless and until either Congress or the Supreme Court
changes the ground rules that have evolved for this type of litigation, all judicial
officers in this circuit must exert themselves to handle prisoner cases in conscientious
compliance with these rules, complex as the rules have become.
Id. See also Merritt v. Faulkner, 823 F.2d 1150, 1157 (7th Cir. 1987); Robert G. Doumar,
Prisoner Cases: Feeding the Monster in the Judicial Closet, 14 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REv. 21,
23.
70, See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2105-06.
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intent of recent efforts by Congress to curb frivolous lawsuits.7 1 The
Courts will be burdened on account of Richardson because an
official's successful invocation of qualified immunity terminates a
law suit before discovery. 72 Without qualified immunity for prison
guards, private prison firms and the courts will be forced to engage in
expensive and time-consuming discovery. 3 This is likely to impose
on courts an unnecessary and costly burden.
Another result of Richardson may be to impair the performance of
private prison guards and lessen the quality of private prison security.
According to the policy objectives articulated in Wyatt, incorporated
into Richardson, and balanced in Procunier, prison guards should
benefit from qualified immunity in order to enable "fearless"
maintenance of discipline undeterred by the threat of litigation. The
appropriateness of qualified immunity for prison guards was
determined by the Court in Procunier, a result of balancing the
guards' and public's interest in fearless maintenance of discipline
against the prisoners' interest in civil rights. Because this policy
balance is indistinguishable in the public and private prison settings,
the Court's inexplicable denial of qualified immunity for private
prison guards in Richardson disrupts the balance reached in
Procunier and may lead to timid conduct from private guards and
violence in private prisons.74
A final result of Richardson will be to drive up a state's costs of
prison privatization in the long run. Studies indicate that the costs to
71. See Sandra I Senn, Stemming of the Tide: Reduction in Federal Pro Se Prisoner
Lawsuits, SOUTH CAROLINA LAWYER 24, 26-27 (Sept/Oct 1997).
72. See supra note 5.
73. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 816-18.
74. This conclusion holds true despite the impact of liability insurance coverage held by
the private prisons in Richardson. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct at 2111-12 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Justice Scalia explained the irrelevance of insurance:
Surely it is the availability of that protection rather than its actual presence in the case
at hand, which decreases (if it does decrease, which I doubt) the need for immunity
protection. (Otherwise, the Court would have to say that a private prison-management
firm that is not required to purchase insurance, and does not do so, is more entitled to
immunity; and that a government-run prison system that does purchase insurance is
less entitled to immunity.) And of course civil-rights liability insurance is no less
available to public entities than to private employers.
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house prisoners in private prisons are high and the current savings
made by states through privatization are low.75 However, studies also
show that private prison management firms have recently made
substantial profits. 76 It is clear that the cost increases in the wake of
Richardson from defending prisoners' lawsuits and paying for
insurance will artificially raise costs for prisons." It is unclear,
however, whether this cost will be passed on to the states.78 States
enjoy only a slim margin of savings in their existing contracts with
prison firms and, therefore, may be unable and unwilling to contract
for a higher price. Prison firms, on the other hand, appear to maintain
a large profit margin and, therefore, may still find it profitable to run
prison even if that means absorbing these additional costs.
Despite the fact that state costs concerning private prisons may
remain the same after Richardson, an increase in prisoner litigation
will have negative impacts. First, it is unfair to increase costs
artificially and unnecessarily for private prison firms despite the
probable lack of short run impact on state budgets. Second, an
increase in costs for private firms raises the already high cost of entry
into the prison market even higher for competitors. This will have an
anti-competitive effect by further entrenching firms with existing
contracts with states. In the long run, this likely will raise the costs to
states of prison privatization by inhibiting their ability to choose
among competitive bidders.
75. See Bates, supra note 1, at FL. Bates' article relates that a 1996 report by the GAO
based on cost comparisons between public and private prisons concluded that there was not
"substantial evidence that savings have occurred." Id.
76. See Bates, supra note 1, at Fl. Bates reports that "Corrections Corporation ranks
among the top five performing companies on the New York Stock Exchange over the past three
years. The value of its shares has soared from $50 million when it went public in 1986 to more
than $3.5 billion at its peak last October." Id.; see also Carrington Nelson, CCA Posts Record
Performance, NAHSVILLE BANNER, Feb. 19, 1998, at B2 ("For all of 1997, CCA earned $53.9
million, or 61 cents a diluted share, up 75 percent from $30.9 million, or 36 cents, in the prior
year. Revenues for the year rose 58 percent to $462 million from $293 million.").
77. See Richardson, 117 S. Ct. at 2112-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
78. See id. Justice Scalia asserted that the majority's decision would lead to an "artificial"
increase in private prison costs: "Whether this will cause privatization to be prohibitively
expensive, or instead simply divert state funds that could have been saved or spent on additional
prison services, it is likely that taxpayers and prisoners will suffer as a consequence." Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
The Richardson decision was unfortunate. The decision makes
little sense legally or logically in that it deprives private prison guards
of a privilege enjoyed by their public counterparts who perform
analogous functions under analogous circumstances. Furthermore, the
decision makes even less sense in light of its costly impact on states,
private prisons, and courts.
David Lemkemeier"
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